



ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
DIRECTOR, THE JOINT STAFF
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Revised Arms Control Planning Assumptions

Reference: USD(A&T) Memo, Subject: Revised Arms Control Treaty Planning Assumptions.
dated July 9, 1999 (U).

The attached DoD planning assumptions package supersedes those in the Reference.
DoD components will use these planning assumptions for programming and budgeting purposes.

Updates of these assumptions will be issued when necessary. Direct inquiries to the
office of Arms Control Implementation and Compliance (ACI&C), LCDR Mike Woods, (703)
697-8158.

J. S. Gansler

Attachment: As Stated
cc: USD(P)



**DoD General Planning Assumptions for
Arms Control Treaties and Agreements
FY 01-06**

- All support operations necessary to verify and comply with arms control treaties and agreements, which include the necessary logistics, personnel, operational training, RDT&E, and coordination activities, will be conducted throughout the life of the treaties and agreements.
- The U.S. will ensure communication and automation systems are adequately manned, housed, and maintained to provide required treaty/agreement notifications. The U.S. systems will be compatible with international communications systems.
- The U.S. will ensure the continued protection of sensitive and proprietary facilities, equipment, and information that may be vulnerable to treaty verification activities.

**DoD Planning Assumptions for Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL)
FY 01-06**

Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

- The U.S. Government (USG) ratified Protocol II of the CCW on 24 March 1995.
- The CCW Review Conference agreed to adopt an Amended Protocol II in May 1996. The President submitted Amended Protocol II to the Senate for advice and consent in January 1997. Amended Protocol II entered into force (EIF) for State Parties on 3 December 1998. The USG ratified Amended Protocol II 24 May 99 and it is currently in force.
- DoD is in compliance with Amended Protocol II as follows:
 - All affected APL comply with the detectability standards (detection signature equivalent to a mass of at least eight grams of iron).
 - All remotely delivered APL comply with the self-destruct (SD) (90% SD within 30 days) and self-deactivation (SDA) (no more than 1 in 1000 will function after 120 days) requirements.
 - All new minefields under DoD control, except remotely delivered minefields, will be marked and monitored in accordance with CCW Amended Protocol II.
 - All service doctrine, manuals, and training materials conform with the Amended Protocol II requirements.
 - DoD has plans for the clearance, removal, destruction, or maintenance of APL following the cessation of hostilities in which they are employed.
- DoD will support USG participation in the CCW Review Conference and associated preparatory conferences expected to be held in 2000 and 2001.

**DoD Planning Assumptions for Conventional Treaties/Agreements
FY 01-06**

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty:

- Provisional entry into force (EIF) occurred on July 17, 1992, and final EIF occurred November 9, 1992. By agreement among participants, final EIF was made retroactive to July 17, 1992. All measures were fully implemented during the provisional period and the Baseline period that ended November 13, 1992.
- The residual period extends through the life of the Treaty and began at the end of the residual level validation period (March 16, 1996).
 - The U.S. will be allocated approximately 15 percent of the active inspections available to NATO. This will result in approximately 20 active inspections for FY 00 and onward.
- Additional active inspections (known as supplemental inspections) are being conducted in Russia and Ukraine as part of the resolution agreement for the "Flank" issue. These will continue under CFE Adaptation. Supplemental inspection teams (U.S. and NATO) pay their own way.
 - Additional active on-site experts visits are being conducted east of the Ural Mountains to verify Russia's compliance with the Soviet representative's June 14, 1991, declaration on destruction of equipment removed from the zone of application. The Russian Federation failed to complete this equipment elimination by the year 2000 and these visits are expected to continue at least through FY00.
 - The U.S. will participate in multi-national teams for inspections at sites for destruction of equipment below maximum levels for holdings events, and any remaining reduction events at reduction sites.
 - U.S.-led teams have six U.S. team members.
 - DTRA will request U.S. representation when teams are led by other nations.
 - The U.S. will not turn down any opportunities to lead inspections to destruction or reduction events.
 - The U.S. anticipates receiving approximately nine passive, declared-site inspections annually throughout the life of the Treaty.
 - As a Stationing State Party, the U.S. forces are subject to any challenge inspection conducted against the Host State Party.
- DTRA will provide liaison officers (LNOs) to each host nation escort team during any

inspection in which U.S. facilities or equipment might be subject to inspection.

- The U.S. will participate in NATO's Verification Coordinating Committee's program of providing and hosting guest inspectors on inspection teams.
 - DTRA will request U.S. representation when teams are led by other nations.
- Preparations to receive inspections will require training of key personnel at each U.S. facility and headquarters in the zone of application on a continuing basis throughout the life of the Treaty.
- Preparations to conduct inspections will require training of inspectors, escorts, and augmentees on a continuing basis throughout the life of the Treaty.
- Preparations for inspection include development of site diagrams to Treaty specifications; and arrangement of administrative and logistical support for inspectors, escorts, host nation escorts and support personnel that will be on site during inspections.
- The Treaty will continue in force until the Adapted Treaty enters into force. Signature of the Agreement on CFE Adaptation occurred on 19 November 1999.

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures:

- In addition to CFE Treaty inspections in Europe, the U.S. will participate in inspection/evaluation/observation/equipment demonstrations and military facility/formation visit provisions of the Vienna Document 99.
 - The U.S. will conduct six active inspections/evaluations annually.
 - The U.S. anticipates receiving one evaluation visit annually. The U.S. will provide LNOs for host nation inspections when U.S. facilities or equipment are involved.
 - The U.S. will host one air base visit and one military facility visit during the period of these planning assumptions.
 - The U.S. will provide two observers/visitors to all air base/military facility visits, as well as all observable exercises/military activities and weapons demonstrations.
 - The U.S. may co-host visits whenever U.S. forces are engaged in military activities, such as peacekeeping deployments, exceeding certain thresholds or to dispel concerns.
- Preparations to receive inspections, evaluation, or visits will require training of key personnel at each U.S. facility and headquarters in the zone of application on a continuing basis throughout the life of the Agreement. As a stationing state party, U.S. forces are subject to any challenge inspection conducted against the Host State Party.

- The Vienna Document 1999 was adopted at Istanbul on 16 November 1999. There are no substantial implementation changes from Vienna Document 1994.

**DoD Planning Assumptions for an Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE)
FY 01-06**

- An adapted CFE Treaty was signed by the States Parties at the November 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit.
- At this time, it appears that at the earliest, the adapted CFE Treaty will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification in the 1st Quarter, FY01.
- At this time, it appears that at the earliest, EIF for the adapted CFE Treaty will be in the 3rd Quarter, FY01.
- The adapted CFE Treaty will not be provisionally applied.
- The adapted CFE Treaty includes the following provisions:
 - Bloc-to-Bloc limits on Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) have been replaced by National Ceilings and Territorial Ceilings.
 - All TLE categories (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft) are included in National Ceilings. Only ground TLE is included in Territorial Ceilings.
 - There is no increase in overall TLE entitlements for any State Party.
 - States Parties are allowed to temporarily exceed Territorial Ceilings through basic and exceptional temporary deployments, UN or OSCE mandate for operations in support of peace, or military exercises notified 42 days in advance, and not exceeding 42 days in duration
 - TLE in transit across territorial boundaries shall be exempt from territorial ceilings of the transited state(s) party(ies), provided certain treaty requirements are met.
 - The May 1996 Flank Agreement was modified, but the concept of flank TLE limits and notifications contained in Article V of the original CFE Treaty remains in the adapted CFE Treaty.
 - While provisions for Designated Permanent Storage Sites (DPSS) will be included in the adapted Treaty, most NATO states will convert 20% of their authorized DPSS holdings to active holdings, and eliminate the remaining 80% from their National Ceilings. Others may do the same. Russia will be allowed to convert its DPSS entitlements in the flank to active entitlements.
 - Passive quotas for on-site inspections will increase from 15% to 20% of all declared Objects of Verification (OOVs), with inspecting States required to bear the cost of the additional 5%. This will increase the US passive quota from 9 to 12 in the first

year following EIF.

- States wishing to become States Parties to the adapted CFE Treaty will require the unanimous consent of all Treaty States Parties.

- The adapted CFE treaty will require quarterly notification or information exchanges effective with EIF.

- CFE adaptation, with its anticipated National and Territorial Ceiling structures, as well as Temporary Deployment and transit provisions, will generate significantly more analysis, monitoring and reporting needs for DOD and the Services to implement.

- The adapted information exchange will require R&D resources for the development of new software.

- The initial U.S. information exchange following EIF will be conducted no earlier than 1st Quarter, FY02.

- User data management workload associated with changing the frequency of information exchanges from annually to quarterly will increase by at least 25% over FY99 levels.

DoD Planning Assumptions for Open Skies Treaty
FY 01-06

- The Open Skies Treaty was signed in March 1992 and entry into force (EIF) is projected to occur during the 1st Quarter FY01. Provisional application of specific requirements of the treaty is in effect until June 30, 2000 with further extension of provisional application possible at that time. The first observation period will be from EIF through December 31 of the year following EIF.
 - The U.S. will plan to receive a minimum of four, and no more than nine, observations in the first observation period.
 - The U.S. will conduct nine observations of other States Parties (eight [8] over Russia/Belarus, one [1] [shared with Canada] over Ukraine) in the first observation period.
- The number of U.S. performed and received observations, after the first observation period, and prior to full implementation of the Treaty, will be determined on a yearly basis. It is anticipated the number per annum will be less than the maximum allowed by the Treaty (31 during the initial implementation phase). For planning and budgeting purposes, plan on the following:
 - The U.S. will conduct 15 observations per year following the first observation period.
 - The U.S. will receive 15 observations per year following the first observation period.
- During full implementation of the Treaty, it is anticipated the number per annum will be less than the maximum allowed by the Treaty (42). For planning and budgeting purposes, plan on the following:
 - The U.S. will conduct 22 Open Skies observations per year during full implementation.
 - The U.S. will receive 22 Open Skies observations per year during full implementation.
- The U.S. will conduct training missions in addition to Treaty observations from pre-EIF preparations through the life of the Treaty. These missions include U.S.-only dress rehearsals, and foreign joint training missions as required.
- U.S. forces stationed outside U.S. territory will be subject to observations over the territory of host countries that are signatories to the Treaty.
- The U.S. will ensure communication systems are maintained to provide required Treaty notifications. The U.S. system will be compatible with the international communications

system.

- The operational mission will be supported by a DTRA/USAF team.
- The USAF mission is as follows:
 - Acquire, operate, and maintain aircraft.
 - Aircraft will be co-located with similar type aircraft to provide economical maintenance and logistic support.
 - Acquire, integrate, and maintain sensors.
 - Equipment includes optical cameras, video camera(s), synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and infrared line scanner.
 - Provide initial processing/development of recorded media.
 - Provide technical support to DTRA concerning proper sensor selection and media processing for both active and passive observation missions.
- The DTRA mission will parallel their mission for other arms control agreements and will include:
 - Overall leadership, management, and support of U.S. Open Skies observation teams and escort activities, to include transportation, linguists, communications, training, Technical Equipment Inspection (TEI), and Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP).
 - Provide all sensor operators/flight monitors on both active and passive overflight missions.

**DoD Planning Assumptions for START I
FY 01-06**

- Entry into Force (EIF) of the START Treaty occurred on December 5, 1994.
 - If required, a PPCM site will be established in the U.S. at the Thiokol Facility in Promontory, Utah.
 - All PPCM construction plans should be prepared for implementation according to the minimum requirement necessary to comply with all Treaty obligations. Services/Agencies shall plan and budget for Russian initiation of their PPCM right at Promontory, Utah no later than June 2000.
- **Inspections/Visits:**
 - Conversion or elimination inspections: National Technical Means will be used for verification of conversion or elimination of some items subject to the Treaty. On-site inspection will be used whenever the right to on-site inspection is provided in the Treaty.
 - **Short Notice Inspections:**
 - The U.S. will maintain the capability to perform up to 35 short notice inspections per year in the successor states of the former Soviet Union which are party to the START Treaty (15 Data Update/Suspect Site, 10 RV On-Site, 3 Formerly Declared Facility, plus Post Dispersal, Close Out and New Facility Inspections).
 - The U.S. will maintain the capability to support 35 short notice inspections conducted by the successor states of the former Soviet Union which are party to the START Treaty in the U.S. each year.
 - **Special Right of Access Visits (SAV):**
 - The Air Force, Navy, and Army will be prepared to support at least one SAV per year. Services will fund inspections at their installations, except for those costs DTRA funds for inspection support.
 - The U.S. will conduct SAVs in the former Soviet Republics party to START. The number conducted will depend on the requirement to use SAVs to resolve compliance concerns.

**DoD Planning Assumptions for START II
FY 01-06**

- Entry into Force (EIF) will occur 3rd Quarter FY 00 to 1st Quarter FY 01.
- **Deactivation:**
 - The U.S. will deactivate by December 31, 2003, all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that will be eliminated under START II. Deactivation will be achieved by removing the nuclear reentry vehicles from the missiles, or by taking other steps to be jointly agreed. Upon EIF, the U.S. and Russia will begin work to reach such agreement.
- **Drawdown Phase Points:**
 - U.S. planning will reflect a drawdown to an aggregate limit of no more than 4250 deployed attributable warheads (of which no more than 2160 may be on Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and no more than 1200 on Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVed) Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) by December 31, 2004, and an aggregate limit of no more than 3500 deployed attributable warheads (of which not more than 1750 may be on SLBMs) by December 31, 2007. Peacekeeper silo eliminations must be completed by December 31, 2007 in order to comply with the ban on MIRVed ICBMs.
 - **MM III Downloading:** In the Joint Agreed Statement regarding MM III downloading, the parties agreed that the reductions to the number of warheads attributed to MM III ICBMs may be completed at any time before December 31, 2007.
- **Heavy Bomber Exhibitions:**
 - Will occur NLT EIF+180 days. The U.S. will exhibit, in accordance with (IAW) the Treaty, a B-52H, a B-1B, and a B-2 (shrouding/protection as required). U.S. inspectors will attend all Russian exhibitions.
- **Russian Heavy ICBM Eliminations:**
 - The U.S. will observe the elimination of all SS-18 missiles and launch canisters (approximately 180). The number of inspections and timing will be dependent on the number of missiles remaining at EIF and the Russian elimination schedule. The U.S. will observe the destruction of 10 missiles per inspection.
- **SS-18 Silo Conversion Inspections:**
 - For converted SS-18 silos (maximum of 90), the U.S. will measure the silo depth before the concrete is poured, and after it hardens (two trips per silo). The restrictive ring will also be measured.

- **Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection (RVOSI) of Converted SS-18 Silos:**
 - The U.S. will conduct four RVOSIs each year (in addition to the 10 permitted under START I) of SS-18 silos converted to launchers for single warhead missiles. These inspections will not occur until several years after EIF
- **Rail-Mobile Launcher Eliminations:**
 - The U.S. will observe the elimination of all SS-24 rail-mobile launchers (approximately 46). Russia could keep up to 10 SS-24 rail-mobile launchers at Space Launch Facilities (SLFs) that they would not have to eliminate.

**DoD Planning Assumptions for START III
FY 01-06**

- The planning assumptions below represent a stressing case involving an early entry into force of a START III treaty that could include controls on non-deployed nuclear warheads. These assumptions must be readjusted as START III preparations develop further.
 - Negotiation support similar to START I negotiations, beginning in FY 00.
 - Entry into force as early as calendar year 2001.
 - New inspection categories, comparable in scope to those implementing START I. These are additional inspection categories, beyond those already existing, and will focus on nuclear weapon storage and handling sites.

**DoD Planning Assumptions for INF
FY 01-06**

- Entry into Force (EIF) of the INF Treaty occurred 1 June 1988 and all inspections will cease NLT midnight 31 May 2001.
 - The Parties will fully execute their treaty right to conduct inspections by means of continuous monitoring until midnight, 31 May 2001.
- **"Quota" or "Short-Notice" Inspections:**
 - The U.S. will maintain the capability to perform up to 10 short-notice inspections per treaty calendar year from 1 June through 31 May 2001
 - DoD will plan for a combined total of 10 short notice inspections to be conducted by the Treaty Implementing Parties in the U.S. and Europe each treaty calendar year from 1 June 1996 through 31 May 2001.
- DTRA and the Services will plan for the cessation of short-notice and INF continuous monitoring inspections on 31 May 2001. Possible areas of impact should include, but not be limited to: civilian and military manning, training, airlift support, operations at Magna/Votkinsk, and contract support.

DoD Planning Assumptions for the ABM Treaty Agreed Statements on Demarcation (ASD) and Confidence Building Measures Agreement (CBMA) FY 01-06

- Entry into Force (EIF) of the ASD and CBMA will occur 3rd Quarter FY 01.
- On 26 September 1997, representatives of the United States, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed agreements that clarify the demarcation between anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, which the ABM Treaty limits, and theater missile defense (TMD) systems which the treaty does not limit per se. These ASDs and the Memorandum of Understanding on Succession are to be forwarded to the Senate for advice and consent. The CBMA, the Joint Statement on Plans, and new Standing Consultative Commission regulations will also be provided to the Senate as a part of the package of ratification materials.
- **U.S. Systems covered by the CBMA:**
 - Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System
 - Navy Theater-Wide Ballistic Missile Defense Program (Navy Upper Tier)
 - Other lower-velocity systems as agreed in the future, and
 - All future higher-velocity TMD systems.
- **Notifications:**
 - BMDO, for TMD system acquisition programs, and the Services, for the deployed TMD systems, will establish internal notification procedures and timelines so that, as required by CBMA, they will provide:
 - Within 30 days after EIF or no later than 90 days in advance of the first launch, the names and geographic locations of TMD test ranges and other test areas where launches of interceptor missiles will take place.
 - No later than 10 days in advance of the planned date of launch of an interceptor missile with the use of a ballistic target missile, remaining effective for seven days beginning with this date, the notification of the launch of an interceptor missile including: name of the test range; planned date of launch; planned launch points of the interceptor missile; and planned launch points of the ballistic-target missile.
 - Joint Staff in coordination with OSD and the Interagency, as required, will transmit notifications in approved formats to the NRRC.

-- Services, Joint Staff, and DoD agencies will use approved NRRC formats and other agreements on implementing details to provide the data and notifications required by the CBMA.

- **Data Exchanges:**

-- Services and DoD agencies will establish internal procedures and timelines for reporting information required as part of the initial and annual exchanges of system and component information through the Joint Staff. Joint Staff will provide data for interagency clearance.

--- The initial information exchange will take place no later than 90 days after EIF of the CBMA and will be updated each year thereafter reflecting the program status as of January 1 (and provided no later than April 1 of each year).

-- The USG, led by ACIS with Joint Staff and OSD inputs, will provide an assessment of the TMD programs with respect to the development, testing, and deployment of the theater ballistic missiles confronting the United States.

- **Demonstrations of Systems and Observations of Tests by Other Parties:**

-- The United States may conduct demonstrations of systems and observations of tests on a voluntary basis at existing or any future declared TMD test range.

--- As required, Services, Joint Staff, and DoD agencies will develop and submit contingency plans to OUSD(AT&L) for compliance review.

**DoD Planning Assumptions For the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
FY 01 – 06**

- The United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on September 24, 1996, and the President forwarded the Treaty to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification on September 22, 1997. The Senate, on October 13, 1999, voted not to give its advice and consent to ratification. However, the President remains committed to the Treaty and, with Secretary of Defense support, has directed that his Administration work closely with the Senate to address concerns raised during the ratification hearings in order that the United States will ratify. Further, the United States intends to continue the moratorium on nuclear test explosions and will monitor for the absence of nuclear test explosions by other relevant countries. In order for the CTBT to enter into force, forty-four specific States, including the United States, must ratify this treaty.
- The Preparatory Commission (PrepCom), established on November 19, 1996 for the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the verification regime of the Treaty, will continue its operations until EIF. The Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS), established on March 3, 1997 as the full-time staff component, will continue to perform the administrative and technical work associated with preparing for Treaty implementation and report its progress to the PrepCom.
- Following the Senate vote on ratification, the Administration did express its desire for the U.S. to continue its support of the implementation preparations by the PrepCom as a means to promote multilateral activities related to nonproliferation. United States commitments were made initially with a primary linkage to CTBT. However, given domestic and international value to monitoring under a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions, many activities associated with honoring those commitments are not CTBT EIF sensitive.
- To this end, the DoD should plan for implementation and EIF in the 4th QTR FY02 of the Treaty based upon the following assumptions:
 - The Administration and Congress will continue to support domestic and international preparations for a CTBT, including, but not limited to, establishment of the international monitoring system that provides a significant cost-effective, value-added enhancement to United States national, nuclear test monitoring capabilities and nonproliferation goals regardless of EIF of the CTBT.
 - The United States will continue to honor its commitments towards establishing the International Data Center; the upgrade and new deployment of monitoring sensors, and the development and testing of procedures associated with future verification regimes, including those associated with monitoring for nuclear weapon test explosions.
 - The DoD will continue to participate in all matters associated with the mandate of the

PrepCom. The DoD will maintain full-time representation during PrepCom Plenary sessions and send experts and advisors as needed to support the U.S. Vienna Delegation, the PrepCom, its Working Groups, and the PTS.

- The need for sensor technology, location and installation; data collection, management, analysis, and distribution; and on-site inspection technology will require DoD applied and system-oriented research, development, test and evaluation activities prior to EIF. Given their long-lead times and their relevance to U.S. continued commitments towards a moratorium on nuclear explosions, such activities will continue beyond EIF.
- The DoD will work with Congress to address concerns raised during the 1999 Senate hearings. The DoD will consider an enhanced verification regime, including additional and improved sensors and procedures, to supplement or replace the current treaty-required monitoring suite.
- DoD will support relevant aspects of the provisional system of verification and monitoring facilities required by the CTBT (i.e., the provisional IMS) as these systems and facilities add value to U.S. monitoring capabilities. By the end of 4th Quarter FY02, DoD will install the full network of U.S. IMS facilities. Following installation, DoD will operate and maintain all IMS facilities in the U.S. on a continuing basis and will cooperate with the PrepCom on the certification of these facilities and examine the feasibility of the PTS to provide operational funding following this certification.
- DoD will also continue to operate the prototype IDC through its transition to the PrepCom in accordance with the approved transition plan. The prototype IDC will serve as an integral part of the development, deployment, and employment of U.S. monitoring capabilities. The DoD will provide a long-term sustainment program to calibrate and maintain a state of the art capability at the IDC.
- DoD will support those activities and operations necessary to implement, verify, and comply with CTBT requirements, including the necessary long-lead items required in advance of EIF such as: facilities, logistics; personnel, operational training, on-site inspection procedures and associated workshops, field exercises, and mock inspections.
- On-site inspections will likely be rare events. The full scope of the on-site inspection activities will be known before EIF to allow the DoD components to finalize implementation and compliance plans under development and establish their readiness to host inspections in accordance with established policy and Treaty timelines.
- DoD, along with DOE, will continue to implement annual certification procedures to determine levels of confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. DoD will implement relevant aspects of Presidential Safeguard D and if necessary, implement Presidential Safeguard F.
- DoD will actively support U.S. objectives within the CTBTO upon EIF.
- DoD will coordinate all implementation, verification and compliance activities

throughout the Department through the DoD CTBT Implementation Working Group (DIWG) process.

**DoD Planning Assumptions for the
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
FY 01-06**

- The United States has underway a number of non-proliferation initiatives to increase controls on fissile materials that could be used for weapons production. In August 1998, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) reached consensus on establishing an ad hoc committee to prepare for commencement of formal FMCT negotiations.
- Under a proposed FMCT, the U.S. is pressing for a focused treaty that would require declaration and inspection of production facilities for fissile material, (e.g., plutonium and highly enriched uranium), and safeguards on fissile material produced after EIF. The treaty would permit challenge inspections of facilities suspected of producing fissile material. The DoD implementation of a FMCT requires careful consideration and forethought regarding potential risks, whether direct or indirect, to critical DoD missions.
- Although it is too early at this stage to project an EIF, DoD must provide technical support and planning for the negotiations and possible implementation of the treaty. DoD will base its implementation planning on the following assumptions:
- The FMCT will ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The FMCT will not cover stockpiles existing prior to EIF. Production, enrichment, and reprocessing of fissile material after EIF will be subject to rigorous verification and safeguards. A monitoring and verification regime may include remote monitoring and/or routine inspections at declared facilities, and non-routine inspections to detect undeclared activities at any site. DoD will develop special measures to protect Nuclear Naval Propulsion Information (NNPI).
- The DoD Components will conduct a Comprehensive Review and Technical Assessment by DoD Components to identify DoD programs and equities vulnerable to a FMCT verification regime requiring the allocation of additional program funds to assess and implement the provisions with respect to DoD responsibilities.
- The DoD Components will establish procedures for the implementation of verification measures under a FMCT.
- As approved by cognizant authority within USD(P), the DoD Components will provide technical assistance to interagency discussions and international negotiations and any other technical discussions relating to, the FMCT.
- The USD(AT&L) will supply technical studies and assessments as needed to support USD(P) and U.S. Delegations. As requested by USD(P), the DoD will send experts and advisors as needed to support these discussions in the Conference on Disarmament and its working groups.

**DoD Planning Assumptions for the
U.S. Additional Protocol on the Application of
IAEA Strengthened Safeguards
FY 01-06**

- On May 15, 1997, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a Model Protocol to strengthen its current safeguards system with the aim of improving its capability to detect clandestine nuclear activities. On June 12, 1998, 'The Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the U.S. and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the U.S.,' was agreed to by the IAEA Board of Governors, and signed by both parties. In addition to the language of the Model Protocol, the U.S. Protocol contains a National Security Exclusion Clause and a Subsidiary Arrangement for the use of Managed Access.
- In this agreement, current or former defense related facilities are eligible for IAEA inspections. The U.S. intends to apply all Model Protocol provisions except where they involve information or locations of direct national security significance to the United States. Furthermore, the U.S. has stated that we will treat the Strengthened Safeguards Protocol as a legally-binding treaty, and submit it to the Senate for advice and consent for ratification and subsequent entry-into-force (EIF).

The DoD will base its implementation planning on the following assumptions:

- The State Department will consider in CY00, when to submit the U.S. Additional Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, with EIF occurring as early as CY01.
- The U.S. Additional Protocol will require the allocation of additional program funds to assess and implement the provisions with respect to DoD responsibilities.
- The IAEA will conduct the strengthened safeguard inspections of U.S. facilities. Given the broader scope of the strengthened safeguard protocol and that the U.S. is treating the Protocol as a treaty, we believe that a formalized notification process (in-line with other treaties) will best serve U.S. interests.
- To facilitate a smooth implementation of the strengthened safeguards Protocol in the U.S., we believe it prudent to plan for a single authoritative body to handle the coordination between IAEA and all required U.S. agencies. With this in mind, notifications of inspections from the IAEA would come to a single U.S. center, who in turn would notify all agencies concerned.
- Other treaty protocols call for points of entry to allow for the processing of international inspectors, technical inspection and validation of equipment, and establishing host team escort. The DoD desires to maintain the same control and accountability of inspectors and equipment as in these other treaties and for these reasons, DoD plans to factor in points of entry as part of its planning.

- With the exception of national security activities, the U.S. Additional Protocol will allow the IAEA to seek access to any location in the United States, as defined in the protocol.- The DoD will review the U.S. voluntary offer of DOE and NRC facilities eligible for strengthened safeguards inspections to identify DoD programs and equities in proximity to these facilities. DoD Components will ensure that the assessments that were conducted to determine possible vulnerabilities to DoD equities posed by an IAEA strengthened safeguards inspection regime are periodically updated, including as new facilities are added to the list of eligible facilities. Assessment schedules will be coordinated separately, but DoD Components should plan to have their most current assessments completed not later than 60 days following the final version of IAEA implementation procedures.
- OSD will distribute the semi-annual updates of the DOE and NRC Eligible Facilities list for IAEA Safeguards to the Services and Agencies for review. The Services and Agencies will decide whether or not vulnerability assessments need to be performed because of 1) existing programs located in facilities that have been added to the eligibility list, or 2) new programs being in a facility already on the list, or 3) an existing program transferring or expanding into a facility on the eligibility list.
- The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) will notify NTPO as the OSD office and the Services and Agencies of an IAEA inspection to an eligible facility. It will be the responsibility of each organization to take the appropriate actions (managed access, National Security Exclusion, etc.) to protect their programs located at the facility being inspected by the IAEA
- The DoD and DOE in consultation with other U.S. agencies has the right to determine information or locations that constitute national security significance. The DoD will implement managed access procedures to protect programs and equities of national security significance which is defined in a subsidiary arrangement to the Protocol. The procedural aspects of how managed access will be implemented will be developed by DoD in CY00.
- The DoD Components will establish plans and procedures for the implementation and verification of strengthened safeguards requirements using the managed access framework and lessons learned from the CWC. Schedules will be coordinated separately, but DoD Components should have their plans completed not later than 30 days following EIF.
- Environmental sampling will not be allowed at or near DoD equities unless it has been assessed that no national security information will be at risk.
- Internal DoD notification requirements for IAEA strengthened safeguards inspections must be decided and developed. These arrangements must interface with the single U.S. center notification channel once established.
- The DoD must have an effective voice in decisions that affect its assets. To that end, for inspections conducted at current and former defense sites, the DoD and DOE should

develop a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that ensures consistency during inspection activities and that necessary measures are taken to protect sensitive DoD information.

- The DoD will coordinate all implementation activities throughout the Department through the DoD Nuclear Safeguards Implementation Working Group (NS-IWG) process. Compliance issues will be handled through the CRG process.
- The DoD will complete an agreement with the IAEA to provide technology to support the enhanced IAEA monitoring mission. The DoD will provide for a long-term IAEA technical support program to strengthen the enhanced safeguards monitoring regime.
- OSD Policy will represent OSD in all international interactions and interagency deliberations related to policy, verification, and compliance.

**DoD Planning Assumptions for Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction (BWC)**

FY 01-06

- I. Background:
 - A. Entry Into Force (EIF): March 26, 1975
 - B. BWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs): Second, third, and fourth BWC Review Conferences, September 1986, September 1991, and November 1996.
 - C. Next BWC Review Conference is November/December 2001.
 - D. United States Government (USG) formulation of national objectives and policy will intensify through 2000 consistent with the President's goal to complete substantive work on the BWC Protocol.
- II. General Implementation Assumptions:
 - A. OSD, the Joint Staff, and components will continue to prepare annual information declaration pursuant to existing BWC CBMs (see I.B. above) for DoD submissions NLT April 15 each year. Upon enactment of a BWC Protocol more extensive legally binding declarations will likely be required to an international implementing organization.
 - B. OSD, the Joint Staff, and the components will continue to review annual information declarations with previous submissions to ensure accuracy and consistency.
- III. Negotiation of measures to strengthen the BWC
 - A. USG continues to develop national positions on numerous proposed provisions of a BWC protocol. DoD will conduct analysis to assess the impact on DOD equities and develop detailed proposals for mandatory data declarations, on-site procedures for visits and investigations, Article VI Assistance and Protections, Article VII Scientific and Technology Exchange, and other protocol measures under consideration in the BWC Ad Hoc Group Negotiations.
 - B. Components will make assessments of key issues and support the development of DoD negotiating positions. Assessments will focus on potential impacts of declarations and intrusive on-site programs, and protection of classified, national security information, and other military equities on DoD installations.

- C. DoD will develop criteria for submitting annual BWC declarations and will provide a mechanism for ensuring consistency among past and present submissions.
- D. Technical support is necessary to analyze a myriad of proposals associated with BWC Ad Hoc Group negotiations. The scope of required technical support will include: 1) participation of DoD BW technical experts at Geneva based negotiations and technical working groups; 2) research of related technical issues in defense of DoD negotiating positions; 3) development of databases that relate to DoD equities in BWC negotiations.
- E. Completion of a protocol is expected by 4th Quarter FY01. This will be followed by a Special Conference in 2001, and the introduction of a BWC Preparatory Commission, which will last until the BWC Protocol's EIF, in order to finalize implementation procedures.
- F. Following the November/December 2001 BWC Review Conference, BWC Protocol EIF is expected to be no earlier than 1st Quarter FY 04. Investigations, consultative meetings, and visits, as part of BWC protocol measures to strengthen compliance, will be hosted by DoD no earlier than 1st Qtr FY 04. These BWC investigations, meetings, and visits to DoD facilities per year are broken down as follows: two voluntary visits at declared facilities; five consultative meetings; and five non-challenge visits at declared facilities; and one challenge investigation at a declared or undeclared facility. Due to continued BWC Ad Hoc Group negotiations, the numbers and types of yearly investigations and visits to DoD facilities may change.
- G. Services and DoD agencies will conduct special assistance visits, table-top exercises, mock inspections, and security assessments at U.S. CONUS and OCONUS sites to support the development of BWC Protocol negotiating positions, and to measure and strengthen site preparations and ensure compliance. DoD services and components should plan for their participation, when appropriate, in DoD-wide tabletops and DoD-wide inspection exercises. Participating Military Departments and other Components, including OSD and Joint Staff, will be responsible for funding their own participation and any associated/ additional support they may require. Planning, exercise coordination, and rotational scheduling shall be coordinated among the participants.
- H. DoD should plan to conduct at least one visit and one exercise at DoD facilities each fiscal year, based on envisaged BWC protocol procedures to be coordinated by the BW Implementation Working Group. In accordance with Public Law 106-113, the Secretary of Defense shall make available specialized personnel to participate in National Security Trial Investigations and Visits at non-DoD facilities with the objective of "ensuring that the compliance procedures of the protocol are effective and adequately protect the national security of the United States." The Secretary of Defense may also require personnel to participate in

U.S. industry trial investigations and visits to assist in assessing security implications of such visits or investigations to their facilities. Such exercises will be conducted at USG facilities, installations and national laboratories to include DoD facilities.

**DoD Planning Assumptions for Chemical Weapons Convention
FY 01-06**

- I. Entry Into Force: April 29, 1997.
- II. General Implementation Assumptions
 - A. Dulles International Airport will continue to serve as the designated U.S. point of entry (POE). San Francisco Airport will serve as a limited point of entry solely for the rotation of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) inspectors, without equipment, to and from CW destruction monitoring activities at Tooele, Utah; Hawthorne, Nevada; Hermiston, Oregon; Pueblo, Colorado; and Johnston Island.
 - B. DTRA/OS will conduct POE processing and technical equipment inspections (TEI) and certifications for all CWC inspections on U.S. territory.
 - C. All support elements necessary to fulfill DoD CWC obligations and missions, including personnel and logistics, will continue to be in place.
 - D. DoD will serve as Lead Agency at all CWC inspections and related visits to DoD facilities and DoD contractor facilities that are either former CW production facilities (CWPFs) or CW destruction facilities (CWDFs), or are DoD owned by or leased to DoD, including DoD owned contractor operated facilities.
 - E. The OPCW will conduct the CWC inspections of U.S. facilities.
 - F. Costs of inspection activity under the CWC for DoD CW facilities (to include inspection team lodging, meals, air transport of inspectors and their equipment from The Hague to the U.S. and within the U.S., emergency medical care, inspector salaries while conducting inspections of U.S. CW facilities, installation and support for monitoring equipment) are to be borne by the U.S. Government. The costs will be funded by DoD, except for the costs of inspectors' salaries, per diem rates in excess of the Joint Travel Regulations, and international transport of inspectors and their equipment, which will be paid for by the State Department, beginning in FY 00. (Costs for providing these inspection services for potential DoD Schedule 1, 2, 3, or other facilities are to be borne by the OPCW).
 - G. DTRA/OS will provide, logistics support, and escort functions for all inspections and visits when DoD is the Lead Agency.
 - H. DTRA/OS may provide, logistics support, and escort functions for non-DoD Lead Agencies only on a formally negotiated, cost-reimbursable basis.
 - I. The need for verification inspection technology and data management Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and assessments will continue.

- J. Special assistance visits, table-top exercises, mock inspections, and security assessments will continue to be conducted at U.S. CONUS/OCNUS facilities. The Services will decide which types of preparation activities will continue to be conducted at their facilities. DoD will conduct in FY 00-01, the challenge inspection exercises outlined in the OSD memo of 25 April 2000. In addition, in follow on years, DoD will perform either a DoD-wide tabletop or DoD-wide inspection exercise annually, unless the periodicity is modified by the CWIWG. DoD services and components should plan for their participation, when appropriate, in DoD-wide tabletops and DoD-wide inspection exercises. Participating Military Departments and other Components, including OSD and Joint Staff, will be responsible for funding their own participation and any associated/ additional support they may require. Planning, exercise coordination, and rotational scheduling shall be coordinated by the CWIWG.
- K. The USG will conclude a cost sharing arrangement with the OPCW.
- L. The Army will continue to fund and maintain the Edgewood Chemical Biological Forensic Analytical Center (ECBFAC) (the former Army Material Command Treaty Laboratory (AMCTL)) to maintain certification by the OPCW as a designated laboratory. CWC sampling and analysis support to other DoD components and other USG agencies will be on a cost-reimbursable basis.
- M. The first special session of the CWC Conference of States Parties will be held in FY 02. This Conference may modify the list of scheduled chemicals declarations processing requirements, and inspection technology and equipment. If enacted, these modifications will impact existing inspection and declaration technologies.

III. Declarations

- A. Updates and systematic revision of DoD declarations will continue as required, as well as annual reporting on DoD Schedule 1 permitted production, CWPF destruction, converted CWPFs, and CWDF operations. The current U.S. declaration comprises twelve stockpile storage facilities at ten geographic locations; eleven CWPFs at six geographic locations; twenty-four chemical weapons destruction facilities at eleven geographic locations; six developmental facilities at six geographic locations; one single small-scale facility (SSSF) and one permitted production facility for protective purposes.
- B. DoD will not participate in the collection, reporting or declaration of information regarding Schedule 1, Schedule 2, Schedule 3, or discrete organic chemicals at any contractor-owned facilities.
 - 1. Declarations required for the production of Schedule 1 chemicals under defense related contracts at contractor-owned facilities will be reported to and declared by the Department of Commerce (DOC). DoD expects to receive copies of the declarations.

2. Declarations required for the production, consumption, or processing of Schedule 2 chemicals, or the production of Schedule 3 or discrete organic chemicals under defense-related contracts at contractor-owned facilities will be reported and declared by the DOC.

IV. Remaining Initial Inspections

The U.S. will receive initial inspections within a one year period at 12 commercial Schedule 1 facilities beginning not earlier than 3rd Qtr FY00. Beginning not earlier than 3rd Qtr FY 00, the U.S. will receive initial inspections at all Schedule 2 and 3 facilities declaring above their verification threshold. DTRA will provide POE processing, logistics and operational support functions to the DOC for these inspections on a cost reimbursable basis, as delineated in the DTRA-DOC support agreement. The number of Schedule 2 facilities to be inspected during the first year after the U.S. submits its commercial declaration could exceed one-third the number of facilities declared, but should be no more than one-half the number of declared facilities.

V. Routine Inspections

- A. The OPCW will conduct a minimum of one inspection per year of each declared U.S. Schedule 1 facility.
- B. The OPCW will conduct up to 40 inspections in the U.S. of declared Schedule 2, 3, and other facilities each year, beginning no earlier than May 1, 2000. DTRA/OS will provide POE processing, logistics and operational support functions to Department of Commerce (DOC) for these inspections on a cost-reimbursable basis, as delineated in the DTRA-DOC support agreement.
- C. The OPCW will conduct a maximum of one inspection per year of each declared CW storage facility in the U.S.
- D. Inspections of former CWPFs will occur at every declared facility up to a maximum of four times per year per facility.
- E. U.S. CWPFs will be divided into six geographic regions. OPCW verification activity will result in four inspection visits per region per year. There may be up to 44 inspections of CWPFs conducted by means of sequential inspections during these 24 inspection visits per year.

VI. Close-out Inspections

Close-out inspections are envisioned for CW storage facilities upon complete removal of stockpiles from those locations and at CWPFs following their destruction.

VII. Monitoring the Process of CW Destruction

- A. U.S. CW destruction will occur at twenty-four facilities.
- B. OPCW inspection teams will perform continuous monitoring at U.S. CW destruction facilities during destruction operations. Monitoring of the process of CW destruction will occur at all facilities in the U.S. where destruction is ongoing.
- C. Rotation of OPCW inspector personnel at CW destruction facilities will occur approximately every three weeks.
- D. The OPCW will devote no more personnel and resources (to monitor the process of destruction) than necessary and appropriate for the size and activity level of the facility.

VIII. Challenge Inspections

- A. The OPCW will conduct no more than one challenge inspection at U.S. facilities within the continental U.S. or U.S. facilities outside the continental U.S. in any year. Therefore, DoD components should assume that they will not be required to host more than one challenge inspection per year.
- B. In addition to the US/United Kingdom Host Country Agreement (HCA), the USG expects to conclude HCAs or other planning arrangements with other countries, to include Australia, Bahrain, Germany, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Republic of Korea, Iceland, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore and Turkey.